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To sleep, perchance to have indiscriminable collocated awakenings: ay, there’s the rub
Beauty (see [3]) is a rational agent in an experiment in which a coin is tossed on Sunday
night. She is awakened Monday morning, asked her credence in heads, told what day it
is, asked her credence again and debriefed. If the coin landed heads, that’s the end of
the experiment. If tails, Beauty is given a drug that erases all memory of that morning’s
experiences and puts her back to sleep. Then on Tuesday she does it all again. Beauty
knows all of this in advance. The problem is what her initial personal credence in heads
should be on Monday. A halfer says one-half. A thirder says one-third. For halfers, there
is a second issue: what Beauty’s credence in heads should be after learning Monday.
In a famous early incarnation, credences were tools for gamblers interested in maximizing
winnings. If credences are just solutions to optimization problems, the answer turns on
what quantity is to be optimized, and what policies govern accrual of that quantity. What
gets optimized is, it turns out, not so important. One can stick with stakes and maximize
winnings (as proxy for utility), or invoke information theory and minimize surprisal. In the
former case Beauty will strive to avoid vulnerability to a Dutch Book. In the latter, she’ll
try to maximize performance as measured by a (logarithmic) scoring rule. The policies
governing accrual are what matter. The naive view, which Jacob Ross [10] calls Every
Awakening Legitimacy (EAL), vindicates thirding (see [3], [5], [9], etc.) because whatever
quantity one is optimizing accrues twice if tails.
There’s a competing view, though–Ross calls it Single Awakening Legitimacy (SAL)–
according to which “legitimate” consequences accrue only once, regardless of the outcome
of the toss. That supports halfing (see [1], [4], [6], [7], [8], [13], etc.), modulo agreement
that Beauty isn’t “tipped off” as to the rate of accrual. I take it that Beauty’s choice
between halfing and thirding turns completely on whether she favors SAL or EAL, and
that both choices support stable conventions. So I won’t argue (seriously) for either here.
What I will argue is that Sleeping Beauty’s predicament involves confrontations with nei-
ther the accepted laws of probability nor the conditionalization paradigm for updating
credences in light of new evidence. This thesis leads me to question two recent claims.
First is Ross’s contention that there is a “deep tension” between the one-third solution
and countable additivity of credences. Second is the claim by so-called “double halfers”
([1], [8] and [13]) that Beauty should update her credences in response to centered (de se)
evidence by conditioning on the set of uncentered worlds consistent with that evidence.
Acknowledgement: An anonymous referee commented on a previous version of the paper.
1. I’m okay, you’re okay: why thirders and Kolmogorov are okay
Subject to EAL, the betting arguments clearly vindicate thirding, as has been argued
elsewhere. Another type of argument is from surprisal. If an agent has credence p in A,
her surprisal (the number of bits of information acquired) upon learning A is − log2 p.
Since to know more now is to be surprised by less later, agents seek to minimize surprisal.
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According to EAL, Beauty is surprised twice if tails, so her expected surprisal during the
experiment is −12 log2 p− 2 ·
1
2 · log2(1− p), which is minimized at p =
1
3 .
Other arguments for Sleeping Beauty have focused on evidence. In order for there to be
a change in credence, so the arguments go, there must be a change in Beauty’s evidence.
If that’s right, thirders must argue either for new evidence or for lost evidence. I believe
that both can be done persuasively. In the argument from new evidence, one uses so-called
Jeffrey conditionalization on Monday’s Debriefing (MD)–decisive but uncertain evidence
for tails. The computation is straightforward: one has







while an indifference principle of Elga [3] says that P (heads) + 2P (MD) = 1, yielding
P (heads) = P (MD) = 13 . In the argument from lost evidence, since Beauty has forgotten
what day it is and since what day it is is relevant to heads, her credence in heads should
revert to the expected value of yesterday’s credence–namely one-half if today is Monday
and one if today is Tuesday. The computation is essentially the same.
Many arguments for thirding are possible when one starts by accepting EAL. In the third
section I will discuss halfer responses to the arguments. In each case, the response will be
characterizable as simple substitution of SAL for EAL.
Next I give a diachronic Dutch Book argument for:
Countable Additivity (CA). For any set of countably many centered or uncentered
propositions, any two of which are incompatible, rationality requires that one’s
credences in the propositions in this set sum to one’s credence in their disjunction.
Note: the argument requires only a bounded number of stakes.
Let X be a random variable on the naturals and consider a credence function P such that∑
∞
n=1 P (X = n) = 1− ǫ < 1. For a large M , let (Xi)
M
i=1 be independent random variables
distributed as X is. An agent subscribing to P has Xi revealed to her in turn. After
X1, . . . , Xi−1 are revealed, she may bet a dollar that Xi > max{Xj|1 ≤ j < i}. If she
wins, she gets 2
ǫ
dollars. For any k, P (Xi > k) ≥ ǫ, so she’ll take the bets.
Next, imagine that we have M ! agents, all subscribing to P . Each is assigned a different
permutation π of {1, 2, . . . ,M} and is offered a series of bets like that of the previous
paragraph, but with the Xi’s revealed in the order Xπ(1), . . . , Xπ(M) (the agent wins the
ith bet if Xπ(i) > max{Xπ(j)|1 ≤ j < i}). They all bet from the same account. To break
even, the proportion of bets they win must be at least ǫ
2
. But if Xi is the kth largest out of
X1, . . . , XM (ties broken arbitrarily), the probability of a randomly selected agent winning
when Xi is revealed is at most
1
k
, meaning that the proportion of winning bets is at most
1
M
(1 + 12 +
1





, which tends to zero as M increases. So for large M , the
P -subscribers collectively suffer a sure loss.
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The moral of the story is that, subject to EAL, both CA and the one-third solution are
okay. In fact, they’re non-negotiable.
2. To sleep No more: why no accessible roads lead to violations of countable additivity
According to Ross [10], however, there are situations in which we are unable to subscribe
to thirder reasoning while simultaneously satisfying CA. The situation he describes is a
Sleeping Beauty problem (“a problem in which a fully rational agent, Beauty, will undergo
one or more mutually indistinguishable awakenings...” where the number of such awaken-
ings is a function of a discrete random variable taking values in a set S of “hypotheses”)
in which the expected number of awakenings is infinite. His claims about what thirders
are committed to starts with the following “indifference principle”:
Finitistic Sleeping Beauty Indifference (FSBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for
any hypothesis h in S, if the number of times Beauty awakens conditional on h is
finite, then upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each of the
awakening possibilities associated with h.
FSBI, together with some additional premises (details omitted), leads to a:
Generalized Thirder Principle (GTP). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, upon first
awakening, Beauty’s credence in any given hypothesis in S must be proportional
to the product of the hypothesis’ objective chance and the number of times Beauty
will awaken conditional on this hypothesis.
A pathological example is introduced, purporting to show that GTP conflicts with CA:
Sleeping Beauty in St. Petersburg (SBSP). Let S = N and suppose that Beauty
awakens 2X times, where X is a random variable with P (X = n) = 2−n, n ∈ N.
If Beauty subscribes to GTP, then in SBSP it would appear that she must assign equal
credences to the exhaustive and mutually exclusive assertions X = n, which violates CA.
As mentioned, in SBSP the expected number of awakenings,
∑
h∈H Ch(h)N(h), is infinite.
Here Ch(·) denotes objective chance and N(h) is the number of awakenings associated with
h. It follows of course that SBSP can’t be faithfully implemented at our world, nor at any
nomologically accessible world, nor for that matter at any world subject to a reasonably
time stationary threat of mortality. So it’s unclear how to interpret Ross’s reports of a
“deep tension” between GTP and CA.
I see two ways. Either “tension” is to be predicated of a set of principles when there
exist worlds, no matter how unfamiliar, at which they conflict, or it’s a two place relation
between sets of principles and worlds...with tension between CA and GTP occurring only
at very special, remote worlds. The former reading seems inevitable, given that Ross
doesn’t qualify “tension” in any way, and plainly means for it apply here. However, even
if such a weak modal notion should concern actual agents, pitfalls remain.
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Chiefly: GTP appears to be a red herring. Ross argues from conflict between GTP and
CA to “rational dilemmas”, i.e. “contexts in which full rationality is impossible”. It would
threaten his thesis if the only worlds at which the conflict can arise are so crazy that
even halfers find it impossible to adopt “fully rational” credences there. Ross takes this
possibility seriously, for he briefly considers the following premise:
Sleeping Beauty Indifference (SBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for any hy-
pothesis h in S, upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each
of the awakening possibilities associated with h.
He then writes “One might claim...that...almost everyone is committed to SBI. And since
CA conflicts with SBI, all parties to the debate should reject CA, regardless of whether
they accept the Generalized Thirder Principle.” This could undermine his claims about
the significance of the conflict between GTP and CA, and Ross is quick to deflate it, in
two ways. First by claiming that, for halfers “the conflict between SBI and CA arises
only when (CA) is understood to range not only over ordinary propositions but also over
centered propositions....” And, second, by substituting FSBI for SBI. If the deflationary
project is successful, Ross will have shown that at some worlds, CA by itself is okay, while
CA and GTP are in conflict.
Given Ross’s ambitions, though, conformity with CA for halfers at the crazy worlds isn’t
enough. Halfing Beauty must find it possible to be fully rational there. This seems
unlikely–infinite expected lifespan arguably gives rise to an unbounded utility function,
which elevates the status of known paradoxes relating to runaway utility (in particular the
St. Petersburg two envelope paradox; see [2]) from logical curiosities to genuine rational
quandaries. It’s open to Ross to argue against unbounded utility at worlds supporting
faithful implementation of SBSP, but Ross gives no such argument, and it can’t be the
default view.1 The upshot of this is that credences are rationally constrained by:
Finite Expectation (FE). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, if N(h) denotes the
number of awakenings associated with h, then Beauty’s credences {P (h) : h ∈ S}
should satisfy
∑
h∈S P (h)N(h) <∞.
For consider a situation in which Beauty has been sentenced to an SBSP-style incarceration
involving a mild form of torture...say, being isolated in a room with only a copy of Word
and Object from which all but the middle chapters have been removed. Beauty is free to
choose between two rival groups of scientists (groups Dull and Duller) to carry out the
sentence. Each has already computed the number of awakenings she would experience at
their hands. She’s chosen group Dull, but this choice is arbitrary. Now she will be offered
a sequence of two trades that she’ll have to accept if she fails to subscribe to FE, but
which will leave her worse off. First, the judge (who doesn’t know the values N) offers
1It would be somewhat shocking if utility were bounded for an agent having infinite
expected lifespan, as this would imply virtual indifference, asymptotically, between (even
vast eons of) pleasure and pain.
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her a halving of her sentence to switch groups. By indifference, she accepts, and switches
to group Duller. Next, the judge asks group Dull to reveal their number and offers to let
her switch back. At a price–the quadrupling of her previously halved sentence. This is
twice as much time as she was originally going to serve if she hadn’t taken the first trade.
Nevertheless she accepts the trade, as E(NDuller) =∞.
Full rationality lives and dies with bounded utility. Which, in our context, is reflected
in the FE constraint. What Ross shows is that when (non-rational by default) agents
determine that rational conformity with FE is impossible, they must renounce either GTP
or CA as well. Ontologically, this discovery is almost surely vacuous but, even if it isn’t,
the conflict between GTP and CA does no work in the spawning of rational dilemmas. At
best, it recycles them.
3. A day late and a dollar short: why halfers are okay
There exist natural betting protocols whereby Beauty at least acts like a halfer. Nick
Bostrom [1] proposes a thought experiment (Beauty the high roller) where bets are offered
to Beauty on Mondays only. Given such a protocol (perhaps we agree that phony bets
are offered on Tuesdays so she won’t be tipped off), Beauty should behave as a halfer in
the style of Hawley [4], who assigns Monday probability 1 conditioned on tails.2 If the
one real bet were to be offered on Monday or Tuesday with equal likelihood conditioned
on tails, Beauty will identify strongly with Peter J. Lewis [7]’s quantum Sleeping Beauty
interpretation. Shaw [11] introduces (in essence) bets that Beauty can make only (and
only once) by agreeing to them during each awakening of the experiment. This evokes
Lewis [6]’s answer (familiar to any statistician) to tails world oversampling: sample weight
dilution of the tails awakenings.
The accord between Beauty’s betting behavior under such protocols and SAL is obvious.
Whether there is an accord between Beauty’s betting behavior under such protocols and
her personal credences, however, is less so. Indeed, there doesn’t seem to be any good
reason for the distribution of bets to constrain Beauty’s personal credences at all.
The situation with surprisal, however, is potentially more friendly to halfing. Yes, Beauty
is surprised twice if tails, but from one viewpoint what accrued surprisal is supposed to
measure is information acquired since initiation of scoring, which will hardly be the case
if the same piece of information gets counted twice. From the informational perspective,
there seems to be little difference between gaining, losing and regaining information and
simply gaining it once. In some sense, the initial gain is canceled by the loss. Back on the
wagering front, any contradictory intuition that a lost bet can’t be canceled just in virtue
2Hawley’s position might be described as First Awakening Legitimacy. It and its cousins
(Last Awakening Legitimacy, etc.) surrender Beauty (confident that she’ll only be scored
when she’s right) to the indignity of assigning zero credence to events that turn out to
obtain.
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of one participant having forgotten its outcome is perhaps an artifact of a fairness norm,
or that we imagine money having irreversibly changed hands. But the betting game is
really just a thought experiment Beauty plays with herself. When a running tab between
wagering rivals is kept “in the head”, and both parties forget an outcome, they likely forget
to score it as well.3 Perhaps information loss should be scored as a “negative surprisal’,
or, when one expects multiple surprisals, be weighted in inverse proportion to the number
expected.
I don’t think this ragtag of aphoristic support for halfing does much to derail thirding,
but it does suggest that perhaps the concept credence as previously applied was not fine-
grained enough to handle Sleeping Beauty cases, and that there are two viable options for
its explication. For the sake of exploring halfing further, I’ll grant as much. If you don’t
agree, the rest of the paper could still potentially be interesting to you as a commentary
on a particular type of optimization problem; it just won’t be about credences.
When one incorporates SAL into arguments for thirding, they become arguments for half-
ing. It’s obvious why one-wager protocols (betting paradigm versions of SAL) lead to
halfing, and straightforward enough how SAL changes the information-theoretic argument:
under SAL, only one tails surprisal should be scored, which means that the quantity to be
minimized is −12 log2 p−
1
2 log2(1− p) (this occurs at p =
1
2 ). In the arguments from evi-
dence, meanwhile, SAL manifests itself in the form of either disenfranchisement, a policy
whereby one of the tails awakenings is essentially silenced, or dilution, in which the tails
awakening get only “half votes” each. This policy vindicates Lewis’s view that Beauty
acquires no evidence relevant to heads. Such evidence took the form of uncertain evidence
for tails acquired Monday but reflected upon Tuesday and for disenfranchising halfers (such
as Hawley), Tuesday’s gone. (With the wind, perhaps...how else?)
So for all thirders have said to the contrary, halfing seems to be at least coherent, if
counterintuitive. When Beauty learns Monday, though, things get strange.
4.‘Deal’ breaker: a more calamitous embarrassment for double halfers
According to Lewis [6], when Beauty learns Monday, her credence in heads jumps to 23 , a
move made even more counterintuitive when one grants (as Lewis does) that the coin can
be flipped later that Monday.
Thirders think this is an embarrassment for Lewis, and some subsequent halfers agree. A
“double halfer” is a halfer who continues, contra Lewis, to assign heads credence one-half
3A point that seems never to be discussed in the literature is that as Tuesday Beauty
contemplates betting on heads she might simply notice that she’s a dollar short and,
knowing what she does about her predicament, infer from this that she’s a day late, and
simply not bet. (Or better still, bet on tails.) If the terms of the experiment disallow
knowledge that she’s a dollar short and stakes are in fact a proxy for utility, it could be
argued that thirders owe an account of how what Beauty doesn’t know can matter to her.
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upon elimination of a tails scenario. That is, upon learning either Monday or Muesday
(the latter being like Monday if heads and like Tuesday if tails). Double halfing is halfing
combined with a scheme whereby Beauty updates propositional credences in response to de
se evidence by conditioning on the proposition corresponding to the set of worlds consistent
with the evidence. Such updating is advocated in [1], [8] and [13].
Bostrom refers to his such brand of halfing as a “hybrid model”. Indeed, double halfers
seem to suffer from multiple personality disorder. Like Lewis, they start out ostensibly
respecting SAL, but when a tails scenario is eliminated, double halfers follow thirders in
assuming that the remaining scenario carries full weight. In this respect double halfing
seems to be a reflex response to the most counterintuitive feature of Lewis’s scheme.
The road to double halfing is paved with the best of intentions. After all, if Beauty learns
Monday (or Muesday), there are no longer any indiscriminable collocated centered worlds
to be found. Why would credences not revert, then, to objective chance? It sounds like
a reasonable question. Arguably, though, it betrays a blindness to how peculiar halfing
is in the first place. To be a halfer is to buy into SAL, and if you buy into SAL, you
have to split the legitimacy of the tails awakenings. So if you eliminate one, you lose some
legitimacy. On this view the alternative is thirding–not a novel form of halfing.
The problem with double halfing...more generally, with updating propositional credences
in response to de se evidence by conditioning on the proposition corresponding to the set
of worlds consistent with the evidence...is that it ignores the role of protocol. The locus
classicus for protocol’s role in updating is Monty Hall. So (with apologies)...here we go.
Suppose that a big prize is hidden behind one of three doors, each with equal objective
chance. The hypothesis Door i corresponds to the state of affairs in which the big prize
is behind Door i. If Door 1, then Beauty will have a single awakening, on Monday. If
Door 2, Beauty will have a single awakening, on Tuesday. And, if Door 3, Beauty will have
two awakenings, on Monday and Tuesday. Halfers of course assign each of the alternatives
credence 13 upon awakening.
Suppose now that a halfer learns what day it is, and is asked for her updated credence in
Door 3. Note: if Monday, Door 1 is eliminated. If Tuesday, Door 2 is eliminated. Door
3 cannot be eliminated. Recall that our halfer has prior credence 1
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in Door i for each i
and, if she accepts Elga’s principle, Monday and Tuesday are equally likely conditioned on
Door 3. Suppose our halfer learns Monday. Since the current protocol is isomorphic to
that of the Monty Hall problem, her situation is precisely that of a Monty Hall contestant
that has initially chosen Door 3 and seen the hypothesis Door 1 eliminated.
Accordingly, halfers who update credences by conditioning on not Door 1 are committing
the well-known fallacy of those who answer 12 in the Monty Hall problem, in defiance of
the understood protocols. On the contrary, Beauty’s credence in Door 3 must remain 13 .
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This “embarrassment” for double halfers differs from that of Titelbaum [12]’s in an impor-
tant respect. The main consequence of the observations in [12] is that if Beauty subscribes
to Elga’s indifference principle and performs the fateful flip herself (hence a corresponding
meaningless flip on Tuesday as well) then in order to maintain credence 12 in Monday’s
flip landing heads she has to assign credence 58 to the centered proposition today’s flip will
land heads. As this applies to Lewis as well, Titelbaum clearly intends for his indictment
to extend to other halfers, and only singles out double halfers because Lewis has already
embraced similar counterintuitive consequences in print.5 The mishandling of Monty Hall,
however, isn’t merely an embarrassment...it’s a deal breaker. And, it’s entirely on double
halfers. Lewis responds correctly to the given protocol, and, given that most double halfers
probably have independent reasons for favoring halfing, I take the bulk of the suasory force
of the argument to flow not from double halfing to thirding, but rather from double to
Lewisian halfing.
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